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Miller: Electronic Voting

THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE, THE RIGHT TO
KNOW, AND ELECTRONIC VOTING IN MONTANA
Brian J. Miller*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of electronic voting systems throughout the United
States has exploded in recent years. In 2002, Congress passed the
Help America Vote Act 1 (HAVA), which provided hundreds of millions of dollars to states to upgrade and modernize their voting
systems by purchasing newer electronic voting systems. 2 In Montana, optical scan electronic voting machines manufactured by
Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S) currently count the
votes in forty-four counties. 3 Motivated by Florida's recount debacle in the 2000 presidential election, 4 the shift to electronic voting
machines was intended to increase public confidence in elections
by providing reliable, efficient, and secure voting.5 However, as
the use of electronic voting machines continues, experts, scholars,
and critics continue to question whether the model this country
* J.D., The University of Montana School of Law, 2007; law clerk to Hon. Patricia O'Brien
Cotter, Montana Supreme Court, 2007-2009. The author thanks, first and foremost, his wife Jenny, for
all her support and encouragement. Additionally, University of Montana School of Law professors Tom
Huff, Fritz Snyder, and Betsy Griffing provided invaluable guidance and assistance, without which this
article would not have been possible.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 15301-15545 (2003).
2. 147 Cong. Rec. H9255 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2001) (available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=H9255&dbname=2001_record).
3. Mont. Sec. of State, Elections, Voting Technology, http://sos.mt.gov/ELBNoting_
Tech.asp (accessed May 12, 2008). Under Montana law, a " '[vioting system' or 'system'
means any machine, device, technology, or equipment used to automatically record, tabulate, or process the vote of an elector cast on a paper or nonpaper ballot." Mont. Code Ann.
§ 13-1-101(31) (2007). In the optical scan system used primarily in Montana, a paper ballot
is marked with the voter's choice and then fed into a scanner which turns the marks on the
ballot into electronic data. That data is then stored, tallied, and transmitted either via
removable storage media or electronically to a central location. U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are
under Way, but Key Activities Need to be Completed 8, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05956.pdf (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter GAO Elections Report].
4. 147 Cong. Rec. at H9255 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2001) (available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=H9255&dbname=2001_record).
5. See George W. Bush, Statement by the President, 2002 WL 31421560 (Oct. 29,
2002).
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has adopted for electronic voting is properly securing the public's
6
right to vote and achieving its stated objectives.
One of the criticisms of electronic voting in this country concerns the manner in which it privatizes the vote-counting process
in public elections. States that have electronic voting systems,
like Montana, buy them from private companies. The source code
and software on these machines are programmed to actually count
the votes.7 These companies have expended significant time and
financial resources in developing this source code and software.
Because of this, under the law of trade secrets,8 these companies
retain proprietary interests in the software and source code on the
electronic voting machines.9 As a result, the companies have the
legal right to block public disclosure of the internal workings of
6. Michael A. Carrier, Vote Counting, Technology, and Unintended Consequences, 79
St. John's L. Rev. 645, 684-85 (2005); Andrew Massey, "But We Have to Protect Our
Source!": How Electronic Voting Companies'ProprietaryCode Ruins Elections, 27 Hastings
Commun. & Ent. L.J. 233, 234-35 (2004); Lawrence D. Norden, Statement before Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census,
and National Archives of the U.S. House of Representatives 1 (May 7, 2007) (available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download file 48700.pdf); Cong. Research Serv., Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security
Issues 8 (Nov. 4, 2003) (available at http://usacm.acm.org/usacm/PDF/crsreportE-Voting.
pdf) [hereinafter CRS Report].
7. Throughout this discussion, the author will use the terms "source code" and
.software" to refer to those parts of electronic voting machines that are distinct from the
hardware and have been programmed to count the votes. The difference between source
code and software can be stated as follows. Source code is "the set of instructions that
govern the abilities of computer software ... [written] in a programming language that
bears some resemblance to English, such as the popular C, C++, or Java." Massey, supra n.
6, at 238. Programmers take source codes and "compile" them, turning them into an actual
software program. Id. at 238-39. If an individual wanted to see how a voting machine was
actually counting votes, access to the source code would be required because "[a] person
with a compiled software program on a computer can use its features according to the abilities given to it by the source code, but that person cannot figure out how the software
program works. The relationship is analogous to a person being able to drive an automobile without being able to open up the hood, take apart the engine, and determine how it
makes the automobile operate." Id. at 239 (footnote omitted).
8. See James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167, 177
(2005) (explaining "[flor source code, the more important protection is found in trade secret
law, a regulatory regime predicated on maintaining the secrecy of valuable commercial
information, such as formulas or manufacturing processes. It is easy to understand how
source code fits into this mold; it is, in essence, a formula or industrial process used to
manufacture a functional computer program, namely software in its object code incarnation. Therefore, as long as a software developer takes reasonable steps to keep source code
secret from the prying eyes of competitors and the public, trade secret law provides legal
remedies for its unauthorized and improper appropriation.").
9. David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability:Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 135, 138-39 (2007).
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their electronic voting machines.1 0 In fact, they have a vested interest in preventing this vote-counting software from being disclosed because once a trade secret enters the public domain, it is
no longer secret and no longer subject to trade secret protection. 1 '
One commentator has criticized the anti-democratic consequences
of this privatized arrangement, noting that, "[b]ecause the
software's source code is kept secret, the public cannot readily examine the program for accuracy or for vulnerability to hacking
2
and election fraud."'
As an example illustrating this dynamic in action, consider
recent events in Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District involving ES&S, a Nebraska-based company that is the sole provider of electronic voting machines in Montana. In the November
2006 congressional mid-term elections, Democrat Christine Jennings ran against Republican Vern Buchanan in Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District "in Sarasota County, the epicenter
of what had been one of the most hotly contested, high-profile U.S.
House races in Florida's history."1 3 The voters in the Thirteenth
District cast their votes on iVotronic electronic touch-screen vot14
ing machines manufactured by ES&S.
When the votes were tallied, Vern Buchanan prevailed "with
a 369-vote winning margin." 15 However, the official state certification of the results showed 18,000 "undervotes," meaning that
18,000 voters who were present at the polls and voted on other
issues on the ballot cast no vote for either Buchanan or Jennings.' 6 Jennings, concerned that the 18,000 undervotes were
"due to a software 'bug' not unlike the programming glitches people routinely encounter on their home or office computers . . .
moved to compel state and county election officials to produce
components of Sarasota's iVotronic system, so that her own computer-science experts could examine and test them."' 7 ES&S re10. Robert C. Scheinfeld & Gary M. Butter, Using Trade Secret Law to Protect Computer Software, 17 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 381, 382 (1991).
11. Levine, supra n. 9, at 145, 156-57.
12. Gibson, supra n. 8, at 190-91.
13. Emerg. Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 1 (Jan. 3, 2007), Jennings v.Elections Canvassing
Commn. of the State of Fla., 958 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. App. 2007) (available at http:fl
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlawflitigation/documents/JenningsPetition20forWritofCert.pdf).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. CRS Report, supra n. 6, at 4 n. 7.
17. Emerg. Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 1-2 (Jan. 3, 2007), Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Commn. of the State of Fla., 958 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. App. 2007) (available at http:!/
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlawflitigation/documents/JenningsPetition20forWritofCert.pdf).
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sisted Jennings's motion, claiming its components were protected
by the" 'trade-secret privilege'. . . [and] that Jennings's discovery
requests represent[ed] a grave threat to the reputation and business interests of [ES&S]."18
The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Leon
County agreed with ES&S and denied Jennings's motion to compel. 19 In its order, the circuit court found that testing on the machines done by computer scientists from Florida State University
who were retained specifically to conduct a review of the machines 20 was adequate, and that Jennings had failed to produce
any evidence or credible testimony showing that the results or
testing of the results were flawed. 2 1 Although Jennings presented
expert testimony showing an abnormally high rate of undervotes
in Sarasota County-12.9% compared with 2.2% to 2.5% in other
Florida counties 22 -the circuit court concluded that allowing Jennings "access to the trade secrets of [ES&S], based on nothing
more than speculation and conjecture ... would result in destroying or at least gutting the protections afforded those who own the
trade secrets." 2 3 The Florida District Court of Appeal denied cer24
tiorari.
As the legal battle in the Jennings case continued, other details about the conduct of ES&S in connection with these events
continued to emerge. After the election, a memorandum dated
August 15, 2006, was discovered in which ES&S officials informed
the Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections that its equipment
might not function properly on election day. 25 Although ES&S
18. Id. at 2.
19. Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Commn. of the State of Fla., No. 2006-CA-2973, 4
(Fla. Cir. 2006).
20. Although the circuit court's order was rather sparse in this regard, the facts underlying the testing of the electronic voting machines were discussed more extensively in a
later GAO report. See U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Elections: Further Testing Could Provide Increased But Not Absolute Assurance That Voting Systems Did Not Cause Undervotes in
Florida's13th CongressionalDistrict2 (available at http://www.gonzalez.house.gov/images/
stories/documents10022007_gaotestimony.pdf) (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter GAO 13th Report].
21. Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Commn. of the State of Fla., No. 2006-CA-2973, 3
(Fla. Cir. 2006).
22. Emerg. Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 5 (Jan. 3, 2007), Jennings v. Elections Canvassing
Commn. of the State of Fla., 958 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. App. 2007) (available at http:l!
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/JenningsPetition20forWritofCert.pdf).
23. Id. at 24.
24. Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Commn., No. 1D07-0011 at 3 (Fla. Dist. App.
2007) (available at http:/opinions.ldca.org/written/opinions2007/6-18-07/07-0011.pdf).
25. Jeremy Wallace, Voting Machine Maker Warned of Possible "Issue",Sarasota-Herald Trib. Al (Mar. 14, 2007).
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promised fixes to these problems, they were not provided to state
officials before the November 7 election. 26 The public did not
learn of these events until early 2007. Then, in March 2007, yet
another ES&S memo surfaced. This one was sent by ES&S to a
top Florida elections official and set forth a series of "guidelines"
ES&S wanted the Florida State University (FSU) team reviewing
its software system in the Jennings case to follow. 2 7 Among those
guidelines were "prohibitions against any statements about possible causes of [the] more than 18,000 blank votes in the disputed
13th Congressional District race" and instructions "that anything
that violated a confidentiality agreement would be 'destroyed...

and rewritten.'

",28

A special U.S. House of Representatives task force looking
into this case instructed the General Accounting Office (GAO) to
investigate these matters and issue a report.2 9 After agreeing to a
non-disclosure agreement with ES&S and the Florida Department
of State, the GAO received permission to review the source code on
the ES&S machines. 30 On October 2, 2007, the GAO issued its
report. Its contents did not inspire confidence. First, the GAO
stated it could not provide absolute assurance that the ES&S machines did not cause the extremely high undervote totals because
the GAO could not recreate the conditions that existed at the time
of the election. 3 1 Furthermore, the GAO found conclusively that
the testing of the electronic voting machines conducted by the
FSU experts for the Circuit Court was inadequate in a variety of
respects. For instance, the FSU experts only tested 13 out of a
total of 112 ways a voter could cast a vote on the iVotronic machines. 3 2 The GAO also found the FSU experts tested only ten
electronic voting machines, and only five of those were actually
used in the election. 33 The GAO found this inadequate because
the election employed a total of 1499 machines, and the sample
chosen was both far too small and not sufficiently random. 3 4
26. Id.
27. Duane Marsteller, Company's Memo Involving District 13 Draws Criticism, Bradenton Herald (Mar. 27, 2007) (available at httpJ/www.bradenton.com/election-2006/story/
12393.html).
28. Id.
29. FL 13: House Task Force Refers Probe of Race to GAO, The Frontrunner, House
Campaign News (Bull. News Network, Inc. May 3, 2007).
30. GAO 13th Report, supra n. 20, at 2.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id.
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As this article was going to press, the GAO authored another
study of the electronic voting machines used in the Thirteenth
Congressional District race. 35 The GAO conducted exhaustive
testing of those machines, employing a testing protocol which was
far more rigorous and comprehensive than the one originally employed by the FSU experts. As a result of its testing, the GAO
"obtained increased assurance, but not absolute assurance" that
the machines used in the Thirteenth Congressional District did
not contribute to the large undervote in the election. 36 The GAO
suggested that the undervote was possibly caused by intentional
undervoting or by improperly cast votes. 3 7 However, the GAO
also pointed out that it could not provide absolute assurance because it was "unable to recreate the conditions of the election in
which the undervote occurred." 38 Although the GAO was given
extensive access to the proprietary source code and software held
by ES&S, it submitted the results to the Florida Department of
State and ES&S prior to publication of its report in order to conduct a "sensitivity review to ensure that business proprietary in39
formation [was] not disclosed."
While the GAO was eventually able to obtain reasonable assurance that the ES&S machines were not a cause of the undervotes, this train of events is nonetheless troubling. First, it
should be noted that the statistically abnormal amount of undervotes in the Thirteenth Congressional District race has never
been accounted for. As one electronic voting watchdog organization pointed out, the GAO concluded that other factors may have
been at play in causing the large undervote total, but never actually determined what those causes were. 40 This organization also
noted that investigative recommendations from another study of
the Thirteenth Congressional District race issued prior to the
GAO report were simply ignored by the GAO, casting doubt on
41
whether the report was adequate.
35. U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off., Elections: Results of GAO's Testing of Voting Systems Used in
SarasotaCounty in Florida's13th CongressionalDistrict (Feb. 8, 2008) (available at http:ll
www.gao.gov/new.items/d08425t.pdf).
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Verified Voting Foundation, GAO Report Not a Clean Bill of Health for Voting Machines: Limited Scope Investigation Not Conclusive 1 (Feb. 8, 2008) (available at http://
www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/VVF-Statement-GAO.pdf).
41. Id. at 2.
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Second, the Florida circuit court initially denied Jennings access to the source code on the assumption that the State's evaluation of the machines was sufficient. However, the GAO rejected
this assumption and was forced to conduct extensive testing, taking considerable time, effort, and resources. It literally almost
took an act of Congress to conduct a sufficient review of the ES&S
machines, with a final report issued nearly one and a half years
after the election itself. Still, no definitive answer explains the
large percentage of undervotes in Sarasota County.
Third, and perhaps more troubling, however, are ES&S's reactions to these events. Instead of welcoming the GAO's initial
analysis as an opportunity to improve electronic voting, ES&S rejected the GAO's assessment and instead asserted that the original testing had been sufficient. 4 2 Although the GAO pointed out
that ES&S's confidence in the previous testing was based on a
number of flawed assumptions, ES&S steadfastly maintained its
position. Only after extensive testing, which ES&S itself did not
conduct, was GAO able to obtain a reasonable, but not absolute,
assurance that the ES&S machines did not contribute to the abnormally large number of undervotes in Sarasota County.
Since "[vioting machines are perhaps the signature example
of a device designed to advance governmental and democratic interests,"4 3 this proprietary arrangement between private companies like ES&S and the voting public raises some serious questions. Chief among them is whether the public's access to the
source code of voting machines should prevail over these companies' rights to protect their trade secrets and profit from them.
One commentator aptly described the current situation as "a balance that is skewed in favor of commercial interests and against
those of the public." 4 4 Given that the right to have one's vote
counted is considered a part of an individual's fundamental right
to vote, 45 the policy concerns in this context are of the highest
constitutional magnitude. "No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who
make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." 46
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

GAO 13th Report, supra n. 20, at 22.
Levine, supra n. 9, at 137.
Id. at 182.
U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
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In addition to keeping candidates and the voting public in the
dark concerning the vote-counting process, the proprietary nature
of electronic voting systems also complicates efforts to provide effective and reliable oversight of these systems and the private
companies that market them. As a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service noted, these private companies generally "treat their software code as proprietary information and
therefore not available for public scrutiny. Consequently, it is not
possible for experts not associated with the companies to determine how vulnerable the code is to tampering."4 7 Because electronic voting systems are fairly complicated, they are vulnerable
to fraud, tampering, and error on many different levels. 48 The
GAO noted in its in-depth study of electronic voting systems that
security and integrity concerns cannot be simply focused on the
end result, but must instead address the entire "life cycle" of electronic voting machines, including their "development, acquisition,
'49
and operations.
The Election Assistance Commission and the National Institute of Standards and Technology promulgate guidelines and
standards for electronic voting systems. 50 However, these federal
agencies do not actually test electronic voting systems to ensure
they comply with these standards. Instead, the responsibility for
testing and certifying these systems is entrusted to private companies, known as Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs). 5 1 However, the results of the tests conducted by the ITAs are themselves
proprietary.5 2 Therefore, test plans, test reports, and recommendations made for increasing security, integrity, and reliability can53
not be disclosed to the public.
If an ITA discovers a security risk, vulnerability, or reliability
issue in an electronic voting machine, it can write it up in a report,
but only a small group of appointed individuals and the private
47. CRS Report, supra n. 6, at 6.
48. Id. at 6-10; see generallyThe Brennan Center for Justice & Lawrence Norden et. al,
The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System Security, Accessibility, Usability, and Cost
(Brennan Ctr. for Justice 2006) (available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download file-38150.pdf) [hereinafter Brennan Report].
49. GAO Elections Report, supra n. 3, at 20.
50. CRS Report, supra n. 6, at 7.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Cal. Sen. Elections Comm., Hearing on Voting System Testing and Certification
Procedure,48:08-48:20 (Mar. 29, 2006) (copy on file with author and Montana Law Review)
[hereinafter Bowen Transcript].
53. Id. at 53:10-54:01.
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vendor, not the general public, have access to it. 5 4 The stated reason for this level of secrecy is a legal obligation on behalf of the
ITAs to protect the proprietary rights of the private companies,
since disclosure of such information in test reports would invariably contain proprietary information. In 2006 testimony given
before a subcommittee of the California State Senate, one representative of an ITA likened this relationship to the attorney-client
privilege, telling California State Senator Barbara Bowen that she
would not be able to gain access to an ITA report concerning one of
California's private vendors because of its "proprietary" nature. 55
As a result of this proprietary arrangement, the current level
of oversight over electronic voting systems in the U.S. is
subordinate to the legal interests of private companies. These
companies have the primary responsibility of notifying government officials "of problems encountered with their certified products in the field and to suggest solutions to any problems encountered," a responsibility they do not always fulfill. 56 For example,
Diebold Election Systems failed to inform an ITA that it had uncertified operating software machines for elections in Pennsylvania, a fact which was not discovered until after the elections
57
were conducted.
Similarly, in California, an ITA certified Diebold memory
cards after finding three security flaws. Subsequent testing by
the California Secretary of State found sixteen additional flaws
not caught by the ITA. 58 In fact, the California Secretary of State
ultimately decertified some of its electronic voting machines. 59
The Secretary of State's asserted reasons for the decertification
included the fact that the machines "use[d] proprietary source
codes that are complex and secret so that the absence of malicious
code in the firmware is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
prove or determine." 60 Because of the perceived inadequacy of existing oversight mechanisms, some states have stepped forward to

54. Id. at 48:08-48:20.
55. Id. at 8:22-8:24, 53:26-54:01.
56. GAO Elections Report, supra n. 3, at app. V, 4.
57. Bowen Transcript, supra n. 52, at 39:04-39:08.
58. Id. at 2:23-2:27.
59. Cal. Sec. of St., Decertificationand Withdrawal of Approval of CertainDRE Voting
Systems and ConditionalApproval of the Use of Certain DRE Voting Systems (Apr. 30,
2004) (copy on file with author and Montana Law Review).
60. Id. at 3.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

9

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 2

380

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

exercise oversight of these systems to ensure they are secure, reli61
able, and in conformity with the law.
More recently, the California Secretary of State decertified a
class of ES&S precinct ballot-counting machines that had been
used in California elections. 6 2 The Secretary of State had concerns about the machines and had instructed ES&S to provide
source code, software, and firmware associated with its machines
for review by California officials. 6 3 ES&S did not agree to participate in the review until it was too late to adequately test the machines. 64 Because ES&S refused to cooperate with the certification review, the Secretary of State withdrew its certification. The
Secretary of State's reasons included the fact that ES&S failed to
comply with certification requirements and "prevent[ed] the Secretary of State from conducting a periodic review of a voting system as mandated by statute . . .65
Another example involving ES&S-Montana's own vendorpersonifies the practical oversight difficulties created by privatized electronic voting. In the November 2003 elections in Marion
County, Indiana, ES&S optical-scan machines were not ready for
use because they had unapproved software on their operating systems. 66 Instead of notifying local election officials, ES&S tried to
cover up the situation by reinstalling older, certified software
"under the guise of routine maintenance." 6 7 ES&S officials instructed their local representative, Wendy Orange, to circumvent
election laws and were able to do so because only ES&S knew
whether the machines it deployed in Marion County actually com61. See e.g. Md. Dept. of Leg. Servs., TrustedAgent Report Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting
System (Jan. 20, 2004) (available at http://www.raba.com/press/TAReportAccuVote.pdf);
Cal. Sec. of St., Elections & Voter Information, Voting Systems Review, Top-to-Bottom Review, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/electionsvsr.htm (accessed May 12, 2008) [hereinafter Top-to-Bottom Review]; Colo. Sec. of St., Elections Center, Voting Systems, Voting System State CertificationProgram, http://www.elections.colorado.gov/DDefault.aspx?tid=501
(accessed May 12, 2008).
62. Cal. Sec. of St., Rescission and Withdrawal of Approval of the Election Systems and
Software InkaVote Plus PrecinctBallot Counting System, Version 2.1, as Approved on April
21, 2006 at 3 (Aug. 3, 2007) (available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems/
essrescissionwithdrawal.pdf) [hereinafter CaliforniaDecertification].
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
66. John Fritze, New Voting Equipment Didn't Pass State Muster; Marion County Clerk
Says Omaha Company Tried to Cover up Errorby Reinstalling Old Software, Indian. Star
1A (Apr. 21, 2004).
67. Id.
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plied with local election law. 68 This subterfuge only came to light
when Mrs. Orange showed the Marion County Clerk an "email in
which ES&S encouraged her to help the company hide its efforts
to fix uncertified software that had been used in the [November]
election." 69 Without Mrs. Orange's actions, Marion County officials would have never known about the illegally-installed
software. Disclosure of ES&S's conduct led the Marion County
Clerk to express concerns about "a company that repeatedly has
sold illegal equipment and, in this case, concealed it." 7 ° Similar
activity by ES&S occurred in four other Indiana counties as
71
well.
Hopefully the events in Marion County, Indiana, Sarasota,
Florida, and California would never happen in Montana. But,
given the fact that all of these events involved Montana's sole vendor, ES&S, it is simply unreasonable to assume that they never
could. It is even plausible that events like these have already happened, but the citizens of Montana, the Secretary of State's office,
and local election officials have no knowledge of them because
companies like ES&S enjoy a considerable degree of unmonitored
freedom behind the shield of their proprietary rights.
As Dr. Michael Shamos, one of the nation's leading experts on
electronic voting, stated before Congress in 2004, "the system we
have for testing and certifying voting equipment in this country is
not only broken, but is virtually non-existent. It must be re-created from scratch or we will never restore public confidence in
elections. '72 Since that time, as the Jennings case amply illustrates, little in this arena has changed. In recent testimony before
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives, Dr. David Wagner, a computer scientist from the University of California at Berkeley, stated:
In my research into electronic voting, I have come to the conclusion
that the federal certification process is not adequate. The testing
labs are failing to weed out insecure and unreliable voting systems.
The federal certification process has approved systems that have
68. Jon Murray, Voting-Machine Whistleblower Resigns Job with Contractor,Indian.
Star 7B (May 6, 2004).
69. Id.
70. Fritze, supra n. 66, at 1A.
71. Id.
72. H.R. Env., Tech. and Stands. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Sci., Testimony ofMichael
I. Shamos, 108th Cong. 1 (June 24, 2004) (available at http://gop.science.house.gov/hearings/ets04ljun24/shamos.pdf).
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lost thousands of votes, systems with reliability problems, and sys73
tems with serious security vulnerabilities.

One suggested solution to this problem is to legally require
private companies to disclose their source code to the general public. 7 4 After all, the public is paying for these machines and they
are being used to provide one of the most essential of all governmental functions. As one commentator has observed, "the public
at large should not be treated as a competitor from whom valuable
information should be denied. Rather... the public is a consumer
who wants and needs to know what they are using to vote, com75
municate, and live life."
Unfortunately, it is rather unlikely that either the federal
government or any state legislature would take such a step in the
near future. Indeed, recent attempts to include a provision requiring public disclosure of the source code and software in a bill
before the U.S. Congress were significantly watered down. House
Bill 811,76 an effort by the U.S. Congress to reform HAVA, initially
provided that source code would be disclosed to any member of the
public who wanted it. 7 7 This provision was removed and replaced
with one that limited disclosure to certain classes of people and
required them to sign a non-disclosure agreement. 78
Hopefully, a Jennings-type scenario, or the events that transpired in Marion County, Indiana and other jurisdictions, would
never occur in Montana. Hopefully, the voters of Montana can
trust private, for-profit companies like ES&S to count their votes
with what Justice Cardozo once called "Inlot honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive."79 But if, for some
reason, the machines or conduct of a company like ES&S warranted some meaningful public scrutiny, it is unlikely the company would publicly disclose its source code or software. Indeed,
as noted above, ES&S just recently refused to comply with the cer73. H.R. Subcomm. on Info., Policy, Census, and Natl. Archives of the Comm. on Oversight and Govt. Reform, David Wagner, Written Test. of David Wagner, Ph.D. at 1 (May 7,
2007) (available at http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/IPCNA/davidwagner.pdf).
74. See id. at 2; William A. Wright, Public Access to Vote-Counting Software, 1995 U.
Chi. Leg. Forum 547, 556 (1995); Levine, supra n. 9, at 176-77; Gibson, supra n. 8, at 190.
75. Levine, supra n. 9, at 173.
76. Library of Congress, Thomas, Bills, Resolutions, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dll0:h.r.00811: (accessed May 12, 2008).
77. Timothy B. Lee, House Waters down E-Voting Code Disclosure Rules, http:ll
arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070510-house-waters-down-e-voting-code-disclosurerules.html (May 10, 2007).
78. Id.
79. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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tification requirements established by the California Secretary of
80
State.
In that event, a Montanan could seek access to that information by exercising her fundamental Right to Participate and Right
to Know under the Montana Constitution.' These provisions define the extent and scope of citizen participation in the processes
of state government in Montana. Taken together, they "encourage
open government and maximize citizen access to the decisionmaking institutions of state and local government [and] enhance
the freedom of information which is the cornerstone of democ82
racy."
This article explores some of the legal issues a claimant would
face in trying to exercise these fundamental rights in an effort to
wring proprietary information out of a private vendor like ES&S.
Given the increasing tendency of private companies to provide
public infrastructure, this exploration could have applicability in
contexts other than electronic voting as well.8 3 Part II considers
the extent to which these constitutional provisions would permit
an interested party to pierce the shield of proprietary secrecy that
shrouds electronic voting systems from the public view. Part III
considers whether, following Justice Nelson's concurrence 8in4
Great Falls Tribune v. Montana Public Service Commission,
public disclosure of private companies' trade secrets in electronic
voting machines would constitute a taking under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Part IV concludes by considering potential policy consequences raised by the analysis
presented in this article.
As will be evident, this analysis cannot fully address all the
legal issues that would present themselves in a live legal controversy. Standing, for instance, is a threshold legal issue that is
highly fact-specific and cannot be answered in the abstract. Another issue discussed below concerns whether the public disclosure of the trade secret would constitute a regulatory taking
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The area of
regulatory takings is likewise highly fact-intensive; in many
cases, whether a taking has occurred turns more upon the facts of
80. CaliforniaDecertification,supra n. 62, at 10.
81. Mont. Const. art. II, §§ 8, 9 (respectively).
82. Fritz Snyder, The Right to Participateand the Right to Know in Montana, 66 Mont.
L. Rev. 297, 297 (2005).
83. See generally Levine, supra n. 9.
84. Great Falls Trib. v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 82 P.3d 876, 890 (Mont. 2003) (Nelson, J., concurring).
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the case than on general principles of law.8 5 While this article
attempts to identify some of these critical issues and suggest potential answers, the particular facts presented to a court of law
would be immensely significant in determining the actual outcome. These caveats are important to keep in mind when considering the following discussion.
II.

EXAMINATION OF THE SOURCE CODE AND SOFTWARE OF

ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES UNDER THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND
RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION

Montana's Constitution is unique in its strong emphasis on
the public's right to participate in and observe the deliberations of
state government and to examine the documents used by the organs of government in the course of its operations. Under the
Right to Participate, citizens have a constitutional right to participate in the operation of government:
The public has the right to expect governmental agencies to afford
such reasonable opportunity for citizen participation in the operation of the agencies prior to the final decision as may be provided by
86
law.

Under the Right to Know, the public exercises that right by gaining information about what the government is doing and how it is
doing it:
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to
observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state
government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public dis-

closure.

87

The net effect of these provisions is to increase "the effective exercise of citizenship ... [by] Constitutionally presum[ing] the openness of government documents and operations."8 8 Delegate Eck
explained the policy behind the Right to Know as follows:
By creating an atmosphere of openness in government, the committee believes that confidence in government will increase and governmental operations will be facilitated. Such a provision, far from limiting the effectiveness of governmental operation, establishes the
85. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720 (1999).
86. Mont. Const. art. II, § 8.
87. Id. at art. II, § 9.
88. Montana ConstitutionalConvention, 1971-1972 vol. II, 631 (Margaret S. Warden et
al. eds., Mont. Legis. 1979-1982) (Feb. 19, 1972) [hereinafter Montana ConstitutionalConvention].
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prerequisite to the effective exercise of citizenship in a democratic
society.8 9

The privatization of vote counting implicates both of these
fundamental rights. In addressing how much the public has a
right to know about electronic voting, it is appropriate to analyze
the issue with reference to the Right to Know and Right to Participate because the delegates intended them to be read as "companion" provisions. 9 0 As the Montana Supreme Court has recognized,
"there are several references in the Constitutional Convention
transcripts which reveal the fundamental link between the right
to know and participate." 9 1 When the issue of privatized electronic voting is considered against the policy landscape created by
these two provisions, it becomes reasonably clear that the source
code and software should be subject to public disclosure.
A.

Right to ParticipateAnalysis

The meaning of the Right to Participate was discussed extensively by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. At its
core, this right was a response by the delegates to
increased public concern and literature about citizen participation
in the decision making processes of government .... In part, it is
also a commitment at the level of fundamental law to seek structures, rules, and procedures that maximize the access of citizens to
92
the decision making institutions of state government.

In floor debate over this provision, Delegate Dahood made clear
the guarantee of this provision:
What is intended by Section 8 is that any rules and regulations that
shall be made and formulated and announced by any governmental
agency, which of course are going to affect the citizens of this state
and the common welfare, shall not be made until some notice is
given so that the citizen will have a reasonable opportunity to participate with respect to his opinion, either for or against that partic93
ular administrative action.

Part of the policy mosaic energizing this provision was a concern that the unelected, bureaucratic functions of Montana's government were out of the reach of the general public. "Public
89. Id. at vol. V, 1670 (verbatim transcript of Mar. 7, 1972).
90. Id. at vol. II, 631 (Feb. 19, 1972).
91. Bryan v. Yellowstone Co. Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 2, 60 P.3d 381, 388 (Mont.
2002).
92. Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 88, at vol. V, 1651 (verbatim transcript of Mar. 7, 1972).
93. Id. at 1655.
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awareness and access seem to be the only tools to remind the
great mass of public servants that their job is to serve the needs of
the public and no other."94 It was expected that this provision
would increase, and provide a constitutional justification for, citizen participation in the deliberations and decisions of government. 9 5 As Delegate Dahood stated in discussing the committee's
finding on Article II, section 8: "It is hoped that this provision will
play a role in reversing the dissatisfactions increasingly expressed
regarding bureaucratic authority insulated from public scrutiny
96
and participation."
For present purposes, the issue is what constitutes a "reasonable opportunity" to participate in the use of electronic voting machines in Montana. Should Montanans expect their level of participation in this process to be limited to the simple act of voting or
to seeing the results of votes counted by electronic voting machines? Or should they be afforded an opportunity to participate
in the oversight and monitoring of the use of such machines in a
more meaningful manner?
The Montana Supreme Court has declined to adopt a
"mechanical formula" interpreting the meaning of this phrase as
used in the Right to Participate. 9 7 However, in Bryan v. Yellowstone County Elementary School District No. 2, the Court stated
that, "at a minimum, the 'reasonable opportunity' standard articulated in Article II, Section 8 . . .demands compliance with the
right to know contained in Article II, Section 9."98 In that case,
the Court considered whether a student's parent (Bryan) in Yellowstone County Elementary School District No. 2 (the District)
was denied a reasonable opportunity to participate in a decision
made by the District to close two elementary schools. 99 Bryan
sought access to a spreadsheet which contained information about
all the schools in the District, including their capacity, per capita
expenditures, maintenance costs, educational requirements,
growth potential, and average class size. 10 0 Although the District
used this spreadsheet to decide which elementary schools it would
close, Bryan and other parents did not receive a copy of it until
94.
95.
96.
97.
2002).
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1657.
Id. at 1658 (Delegate Eck commenting).
Id. at 1661.
Bryan v. Yellowstone Co. Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 2, 60 P.3d 381, 392 (Mont.
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 384.
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after the District had already made its decision. 10 ' Bryan subsequently filed a complaint in district court seeking to nullify the
District's decision and seeking full disclosure of all documents related to the District's decision to close the schools.' 0 2 The district
court denied her complaint, and she appealed.
On appeal, Bryan asserted that the District denied her a reasonable opportunity to participate under Article II, section 8 by
failing to provide the spreadsheet to her before it made its decision
to close the elementary schools.' 0 3 In other words, the District
prevented her from effectively exercising her right to participate
by denying her the right to examine public documents related to
its decision.' 0 4 The district court had rejected this argument
when it dismissed Bryan's complaint, finding that the District had
"adequately notified the public regarding pertinent meetings and
sufficiently afforded Bryan a reasonable opportunity to submit
data, views, or arguments orally and in written form.' 0 5 Before
the Montana Supreme Court, the District argued that Bryan's
right to participate had not been violated because it gave Bryan
the information considered in its decision, and gave Bryan an op10 6
portunity to submit her views.
The Court, however, rejected this argument and concluded
the District had in fact violated Bryan's right to participate. The
Court noted that the purpose of Article II, section 8, as expressed
by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, was "to expose
the activities of those bureaucratic authorities which were once
isolated from public scrutiny.' 0 7 The Court held that an
uninformed opportunity to speak would essentially relegate the
right of participation to paper tiger status in the face of stifled disclosure and incognizance.... [We find it improbable that [the delegates] envisioned and subsequently memorialized such a hollow

right." 0 8

Thus, the Court concluded as follows:
Certainly, as the District suggests, Bryan was given the opportunity
to voice her concern regarding the school closure recommendation.
However, she participated under a distorted perspective in light of
the District's partial disclosure of information .... Bryan testified
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 385.
Id.
Bryan, 60 P.3d at 391.
Id.
Id. at 388 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
Id.
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that upon receiving the rating system... she identified many serious flaws and errors in its analysis. She claims that she could have
undermined the basis for the committee's recommendation if she
had had the opportunity ... [and] might have swayed the one vote
that was needed to keep her children's school from being closed.' 0 9

As a starting point, it makes sense to first look to the Montana election code to determine what a "reasonable opportunity"
might amount to in the context of electronic voting. Montana
Code Annotated § 13-15-101 states that "[a]ny official vote count
must be public." 110 Similarly, Montana Code Annotated § 13-15206(8) provides that "[1local election administrators shall... provide for . . . the security of the counting process against fraud."11 '
Further, section 206 describes the vote-counting procedures and
specifies that local elections administrators are to adopt policies
that provide for, among other things, the "public observance of
each count or recount." 1 2 Finally, Montana Code Annotated § 1315-209 specifies that if an election administrator believes a voting
machine is not functioning correctly, he or she must stop the vote
1 3
counting and have the system tested.
Because relevant statutes indicate that vote counts be publicly observable, it would stand to reason that Montanans should
have more than a right to simply view the voting results. If necessary, Montanans should have a right to know more about the votecounting process itself. With electronic voting, even in the optical
scan systems where a paper ballot exists, in the event a recount is
needed, 1 14 the public only sees the results of the vote counting, but
cannot view the vote counting itself. Moreover, the statutory
scheme governing voting systems states that vote counting be
public, and that election administrators have the ability to monitor these systems. How can the public ensure that public officials
are doing their job if it cannot actually see how these machines are
working? As one commentator has observed about the current situation, "when computers are used to record and count votes, ordinary people cannot observe the process. For a democracy to
thrive, all citizens must be able to observe the casting of their ballots and the counting of their votes, not just observe a computer
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Bryan, 60 P.3d at 392 (internal quotations omitted).
Mont. Code Ann. § 13-15-101(1) (2007).
Id. at § 13-15-206(8)(a).
Id. at § 13-15-206(8)(c).
Id. at § 13-15-209(1).
GAO Elections Report, supra n. 3, at 8.
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processing their votes in secret." 115 Indeed, the notion that the
public would not have a right to see how their votes are counted in
public elections, in which the machines are purchased with taxpayer dollars, seems in uneasy tension with this constitutional
provision.
While the optical scan systems used in Montana have a paper
ballot that can be manually recounted if there are election errors,
the votes are ultimately counted by computer programs which
"create[I possibilities for tampering with the counting software
and hardware." 1 6 There are many different ways in which an optical scan system can be attacked, 1 17 and there are many documented instances of optical scan systems failing to properly function. 118 Furthermore, because the votes are counted by software
programs and then stored into memory, "neither the voter nor the
pollworker manning the reader can see what it is recording in its
memory."119
Optical scan systems are programmed by configuration files
to recognize a mark at a particular spot on the ballot and translate
it into a vote for a particular candidate. 120 However, it is possible
for an individual to modify these configuration files in a manner
that would misread the votes, and such a modification may have a
small chance of detection.121 Last year, for instance, Florida's Secretary of State ordered a Florida State University information
technology laboratory to simulate attacks on optical scan systems
to determine their vulnerability to tampering.12 2 The FSU lab determined that someone with "only brief access to a machine could
replace a memory card with one preprogrammed to read one candidate's votes as counting for another, essentially switching the
candidates and showing the loser winning in that precinct.' 23
The FSU lab also concluded that this attack could be carried out
115. Levine, supra n. 9, at 172.
116. CRS Report, supra n. 6, at 3.
117. Brennan Report, supra n. 48, at 26-28 (discussing various types of attacks against
optical scan systems).
118. See generally VotersUnite.org, ES&S in the News-A PartialList of Documented
Failures, http://www.votersunite.org/info/ES&Sinthenews.pdf (accessed May 12, 2008).
119. CRS Report, supra n. 6, at 5.
120. Douglas W. Jones, Threats to Voting Systems, View Threat Papers, Optical Scan
ConfigurationFile 1, http://vote.nist.gov/threats/papers/opscanconfig.pdf (Sept. 15, 2005).
121. Id. at 1-2.
122. Brendan Farrington, Study: Fla. Voting Machines Still Flawed, USA Today (July
31, 2007) (available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-07-31-2804153421
x.htm).
123. Id.
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"with a reasonably low probability of detection assuming that audits with paper ballots are infrequent."'1 2 4 Additionally, a member
of the Brennan Center Task Force was able to use memory cards
in optical scan machines "to create false vote totals... and conceal
this manipulation in reports by the scanners to election offi25
cials.'
Perhaps even more troubling in this connection is the fact
that ITAs limit their involvement to the human interface at the
time of voting, and do not "perform software evaluations at the
central count level ...[or of] . . . the election management system
software. '1 26 In other words, ITAs do not test those parts of electronic voting systems that actually tally and tabulate the votes
themselves.
Because of these "gaps" in the testing and certification
processes of electronic voting machines, some states have taken it
upon themselves to conduct their own evaluations of these machines. Unfortunately, Montana is not one of these states. Montana conducts only perfunctory testing of its voting technologies.
The Secretary of State's office does not independently audit these
machines and simply runs between 25 and 100 ballots through a
small sample of electronic voting machines. 12 7 Neither Montana's
administrative regulations nor its code mandate that the Secretary of State independently audit the machines or test their vulnerability to fraud and manipulation. Interestingly, a recent bill
proposed by Representative Brady Wiseman (D-Bozeman) during
the 2007 legislative session would have provided for greater auditing procedures and testing, but unfortunately it failed to meet the
transmittal deadline.128
Other states have taken an active role in oversight of electronic voting systems. California, for instance, has conducted a
top-to-bottom review of its systems and made extensive findings. 12 9 Other jurisdictions and watchdog organizations have conducted "hack tests" to see if an individual with the intent to ma124. Id.
125. The Brennan Center for Justice & Lawrence Norden et. al, The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World 36 (Brennan Ctr. for Justice 2006)
(available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/a56eba8edf74e9el2e-r2m6b86s2.pdf).
126. Bowen Transcript, supra n. 52, at 4:24-4:27.
127. Admin. R. Mont. 44.3.1704(2)(c) (2007).
128. St. of Mont., Montana Legislature Detailed Bill Information, http://laws.leg.mt.gov/
plslaws07/LAW0210W$BSIV.ActionQuery?PBILLNO1=632&PBLTPBILLTYPCD=
HB&ZACTION=find (accessed May 12, 2008).
129. Top-to-Bottom Review, supra n. 61.
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nipulate vote totals could easily do So. 1 3 0 These are legitimate
steps to ensure that such systems are free from fraudulent tampering. If a group of concerned citizens in Montana wanted to conduct similar tests, they arguably should be allowed to do so. While
most Montanans may not have the ability to understand the
software and source code on electronic voting machines, some
likely would, and their analysis of that code may very well lead to
improvements in the integrity and security of these systems.
This is not mere idle speculation. In fact, the only known instance where source code on an electronic voting system was made
publicly available led precisely to such a result. In early 2003,
unknown individuals posted on the internet confidential emails,
trade secret information, and portions of the source code and
software which operate the electronic voting machines manufactured and developed by Diebold Election Systems, Inc. 13 1 As a result, a group of computer scientists from John Hopkins University
obtained and analyzed the source code. 13 2 In their analysis, they
discovered "significant and wide-reaching security vulnerabilities"
in the versions of the source code that they evaluated. 133 In particular, they noted that the system used fixed passwords that
presented a significant threat of fraudulent tampering. 3 4 As a
result of the publishing of the Johns Hopkins analysis, Diebold
made changes to their password procedure, which "largely
eliminat[ed] this threat."' 35 Additionally, the public disclosure of
Diebold's trade secret information subsequently led California's
Secretary of State to decertify these machines. 36 Without this
public involvement, such improvements in the security of this voting technology and increased oversight by the Secretary of State
may never have occurred. Interestingly, this appears to be exactly
130. See e.g. id.; Brennan Report, supra n. 48; Harri Hursti, The Black Box ReportSecurity Alert: July 4, 2005, Critical Security Issues with Diebold Optical Scan Design
(Black Box Voting, Inc. 2005) (available at http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf).
131. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
132. Aviel D. Rubin et al., Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, in IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy 2004 at 4 (IEEE Computer Socy. Press 2004) (available at http:/!
avirubin.comlvote.pdf).
133. Id.
134. Md. Dept. of Leg. Serv., Trusted Agent Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System
9 (Jan. 20, 2004) (available at http://www.raba.com/press/TA-Report-AccuVote.pdf).
135. Id.
136. Cal. Sec. of St., Decertificationand Withdrawal of Approval of CertainDRE Voting
Systems and Conditional Approval of the Use of Certain DRE Voting Systems 3 (Apr. 30,
2004).
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the type of citizen involvement contemplated by the Right to Par13 7
ticipate.
While it is unreasonable to demand that any voting technology be perfect and function flawlessly, at a minimum the public
has a real and constitutionally-supported interest in knowing how
these machines work and how their votes are being counted. The
drafters of the Montana Constitution seem to have understood
something that is lost on the proponents of privatized voting:
while citizen participation in government can sometimes slow it
down, it can also improve the overall functioning of governmental
operations, as the Diebold example shows. However, under the
proprietary regime of electronic voting, the public is actually
treated as a competitor that needs to be excluded from knowledge
of the inner workings of these machines. The Right to Participate
in this context is reduced to a "hollow right,"'138 with the citizenry
taking a passive role out of deference to the private companies'
trade secret interests. It is hard to imagine the delegates who
wrote, debated, and then ratified the Right to Participate would
approve of the current relationship between the private vendors
and the citizens of Montana; in fact, this would be exactly the type
of "secrecy" they sought to abolish.
In concluding this analysis, perhaps it makes sense to think
of the Right to Participate in this context as covering a spectrum
of possible participation options. At one end of the spectrum, the
Right to Participate could mean that a citizen has the right to
fully access the source code on electronic voting machines. This
level of participation could be justified by general policy concerns
about the inadequacy of the current oversight mechanisms and
the conduct of private vendors in attempting to circumvent election laws. So, for instance, if a company doing business in Montana tried to install uncertified or illegal software on its voting
machines in breach of the public trust and Montana law, perhaps
the Right to Participate would justify citizen access to the source
code in order to ensure the electronic voting machines had been
properly tested and certified and that the private vendor was complying with the law. Or, if the integrity of the voting machines
was ever called into question in a manner analogous to the Jennings case, the Right to Participate could provide a constitutional
basis for citizen access to the source code on those machines.
137. Supra n. 89 and accompanying text.
138. Bryan v. Yellowstone Co. Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 2, 60 P.3d 381, 392 (Mont.
2002).
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At the other end of the spectrum, the Right to Participate
could mean that, at a minimum, citizens should have the opportunity to review the testing and certification reports issued by the
ITAs during their certification process, to ensure that the voting
systems are accurate and secure against fraudulent tampering.
In light of the policy expressed in the Right to Participate, these
reports should be unredacted, even if this allows the public dissemination of some proprietary information, because if the public
cannot have at least this level of participation in the electronic
voting process, they essentially have no level of participation at
all. Simply watching a couple of ballots run through a scanner,
without any access to information about the testing of the
software and source code that actually counts those votes, says
nothing about the integrity of the vote-counting process itself-a
process that is supposed to be publicly observable. While the
Right to Participate may not guarantee unfettered access to the
source code, it should at least guarantee some meaningful access
to the inner workings of these machines irrespective of the private
companies' commercial imperatives in protecting their trade
secrets and their "right" to make a profit.
B.

Right to Know Analysis

Assuming, arguendo, that in the context of electronic voting
the Right to Participate gives citizens a fundamental right to
meaningful participation with respect to how their votes are
counted, the question still remains as to what, precisely, the public has a right to know. This is answered by Article II, section 9 of
the Montana Constitution, the Right to Know. Analysis under
this provision proceeds according to a three-step process as described by the Montana Supreme Court in Becky v. Butte-Silver
Bow School District No. 1:139
First, we consider whether the provision applies to the particular
political subdivision against whom enforcement is sought. Second,
we determine whether the documents in question are "documents of
public bodies" subject to public inspection. Finally, if the first two
requirements are satisfied, we decide whether a privacy interest is
present, and if so, whether the demand of individual privacy clearly
140
exceeds the merits of public disclosure.

Since a person seeking the software would either be requesting it from the Secretary of State or a county elections subdivision,
139. Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. No. 1, 906 P.2d 193, 196 (Mont. 1995).
140. Id.
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the first step of the Right to Know analysis would clearly be met
and require little consideration. Additionally, the third part of the
test, whether the demand of individual privacy outweighed public
disclosure, would also be a non-issue, because corporations cannot
14 1
assert a right to privacy against the public's Right to Know.
However, the issue under step two of the analysis, whether the
software running on an electronic voting machine would qualify as
a "document" for purposes of the Right to Know, is not readily apparent and will be considered in greater detail below.
The Montana Supreme Court has never considered whether
software manufactured by a private company that carries out an
official governmental function would be a document subject to
public disclosure under the Right to Know. However, prior jurisprudence under Article II, section 9, the policy behind the Right to
Know, and Montana law all point to the conclusion that such
software should be considered a document under the Right to
Know.
In the first instance, it is important to note that the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention made a conscious choice to give
the term "document" a broad, flexible meaning. As originally proposed, the text of this provision contained the phrase "public document."'14 2 However, a decision was made in committee to strike
the word "public" in order "to avoid tying the viability of this provision" to previous statutory and constitutional attempts to define
a public document. 1 43 Instead of giving the term "document" a
rigid, technical meaning, the delegates chose to leave the meaning
of this term open and limit the extent of the Right to Know by
balancing it against the demands of individual privacy. 14 4 The
delegates hoped this approach would eliminate the possibility that
one would "risk losing the right to examine a document because it
1 45
does not fit statutory categories as a public document."
Two leading Montana Supreme Court cases are instructive
regarding what constitutes a document under the Right to
Know-Becky and Bryan. In Becky, parents of a student at Butte
High School sought documents related to a decision to deny their
son admission to the National Honor Society. 1 4 6 In particular, the
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Great Falls Trib. v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 82 P.3d 876, 883 (Mont. 2003).
Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 88, at vol. V, 1670.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. No. 1, 906 P.2d 193, 194 (Mont. 1995).
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parents wanted to know which teachers at Butte High School had
voted to deny their son entrance into the National Honor Society,
as well as obtain other National Honor Society documents pertaining to the denial of their son's admission. 147 The parents eventually received some of the documentation they requested but not
the names of the teachers who voted against their son's admission
or the National Honor Society documentation explaining why
their son was denied admission. 148 The parents subsequently
sued Butte High School in district court seeking access to the documents under the Right to Know.1 49 The district court dismissed
the suit, and the parents appealed to the Montana Supreme
Court. On appeal, the parents argued that "all records or documents kept by the School District constitute public records ...and
are thus subject to examination as provided by Article II, Section
' 150
9, of the Montana Constitution.
The Court began its analysis of the parents' request for documents by turning to the pertinent statutory provisions to determine whether the documents at issue constituted a "public writing."1 5 ' While the Court acknowledged that the Montana Constitution "preempts contrary statutes or rules," it found that a state
statute may help to "interpret a constitutional provision when [it
is] relevant to, and does not conflict with, the constitutional provision."1 5 2 Examining the relevant statutes in this case led the
Court to conclude that the documents at issue did not fit into any
statutorily-created categories of public writings or documents, did
not record the acts of the school district, and thus were not subject
to disclosure under the Right to Know. 1 53 Further, the Court
noted that because the National Honor Society documents were
"neither created by nor maintained by Butte-Silver Bow School
District, and ... [were] not related to the function and duties of
the School District," Butte High School was not required to pro154
duce them.
In Bryan, the Court considered whether a spreadsheet generated for the Yellowstone County School District was a document
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 195.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Becky, 906 P.2d at 196.
Id. at 197.

Id.
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within the meaning of the Right to Know. 15 5 A committee had
prepared the spreadsheet to assist in its deliberations concerning
the closing of elementary schools in Yellowstone County and relied on the spreadsheet in deciding to recommend closing certain
elementary schools, but never revealed the spreadsheet to the
public until after the decision was made. Parents of students in
Yellowstone County sought access to the spreadsheet, which contained a variety of detailed data on the schools in Yellowstone
County.156 Some of the parents sued the Yellowstone County
School District, arguing that its failure to publicly disclose this
document prior to a final decision violated the parents' Right to
Participate and Right to Know under the Montana Constitu1 57
tion.
Although both parties urged the Court to rely solely on statutory definitions to determine whether the spreadsheet was a document within the meaning of the Right to Participate, the Court
rejected that approach. While the Court acknowledged its reliance on statutory language in Becky to determine whether a document fell within Article II, section 9, it noted that "we ultimately
interpreted the constitutional 'documents of public bodies' much
more broadly than the legislative construct." 5 8
The standard ultimately adopted by the Court in Bryan was
simply that "documents" for purposes of the Right to Know "mean
documents generated or maintained by a public body which are
somehow related to the function and duties of that body."1 5 9 In
analyzing the document at issue, the Court noted first that the
committee was a public body. 160 Second, the Court pointed out
that the spreadsheet was generated by a board member "to assist
in the function of that body's charge, while acting in his capacity
as a member of the Facilities Committee." 16 1 Based on this, the
Court concluded "the spreadsheet was a document of a public body
62
subject to public inspection."'
155. Bryan v. Yellowstone Co. Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 2, 60 P.3d 381, 389 (Mont.
2002).
156.
157.
158.
159.
1995)).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 384-85.
at 385-86.
at 389.
(quoting Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. No. 1, 906 P.2d 193, 197 (Mont.

160. Id.
161. Bryan, 60 P.3d at 389.
162. Id.
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Following the reasoning in Becky and Bryan, the first step in
considering whether source code or software on an electronic voting machine would be considered a "document" under the Right to
Know would be to turn to any relevant statutes for legislative guidance. Unfortunately, the statutes governing the use of electronic
voting systems in Montana do not specifically indicate whether
the software on the machine would be considered a document subject to inspection. The election code does state that the computer
programs need to be accessible to auditors "to determine whether
the software [on the system] is running properly," 163 but does not
define whether these programs qualify as documents.
However, Montana's criminal code defines a "computer program" as "an instruction or statement or a series of instructions or
statements, in a form acceptable to a computer, that in actual or
modified form permits the functioning of a computer or computer
system and causes it to perform specified functions."1 6 4 In light of
this definition, the software programs running on a voting machine might be considered a set of instructions rather than a "document," because those programs do not actually record voting results, but instead instruct the machines how to count votes. In
essence, these programs carry out the function of a state agency.
Thus, while the results of vote counting stored on a memory device
would come under the Right to Know as documents pursuant to
Montana Code Annotated § 2-6-401(2)(a)(i)(A), it is less clear,
from a statutory perspective at least, whether the software would
as well.
The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure do define the term
"document" in a broad manner that would cover the software on
the voting machines. In Rule 34(a) of the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure, "documents [include] writings, drawings ...and other
data or data compilations ... from which the information can be
obtained, [or] translated, if necessary, by the respondent into reasonably usable form."'1 65 Under this broad definition, the software
would qualify as a document because analysis of that software and
source code would provide information concerning how the machines record, store, and tally the votes. Additionally, the definition of "document" from Black's Law Dictionary supports a broad
reading in this context. There, a document is defined as
163. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-17-103(1)(1) (2007).
164. Id. at § 45-2-101(11).
165. M. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
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"[s]omething tangible on which words, symbols, or marks are re16 6
corded."
Arguably the statutory guidance in this area is not clear-cut,
and it is likely that a court would require more analysis before
deciding whether the source code or software would be a "document" under the Right to Know. While no statutes expressly state
that the source code and software on electronic voting machines
would be "documents" for purposes of Article II, section 9, the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure and Black's Law Dictionary
suggest a broader reading could apply. The issue in this regard
would be simply whether these programs, as they sit on the voting
machines, are "documents generated or maintained by a public
body which are somehow related to the function and duties of that
16 7
body."
Ultimately, resolution of this question would likely come
down to whether a court in Montana would give the term "document" a broad or narrow reading in this context. Faced with a
close call in this case, it would be more legally accurate to consider
the source code and software a "document" under the Right to
Know for three reasons. First, the delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention expressed the intent that a document should
not be disqualified from disclosure for failure to meet a statutory
or technical definition of document. In fact, the delegates implied
very strongly that in close cases, the balance should be tipped in
favor of the Right to Know. 168 Second, the software on the machines describes the precise manner in which votes are to be
counted, a process that could be publicly viewed prior to the introduction of these systems.169 The fact that this formerly open and
public process has now been transformed into binary code should
not disqualify it from being publicly observable. Moreover, there
are explicit instructions contained in Montana's administrative
regulations for conducting a manual recount of ballots that are
166. Black's Law Dictionary 498 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West Publg. Co. 1999).
Interestingly, Black's definition of "public document" provides less guidance on this point
because it defines a public document as "[a] document of public interest issued or published
by a political body or otherwise connected with public business." Id. This definition suffers
from the same ambiguity present in the general interpretative rule of document adopted in
Bryan. On the one hand, the software is not published or issued by any public body in
Montana; on the other hand, it is "otherwise connected with public business."
167. Bryan, 60 P.3d at 389 (citing Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. No. 1, 906 P.2d
193, 197 (Mont. 1995)).
168. Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 88, at vol. V, 1670 (verbatim transcript of Mar. 7, 1972).
169. See e.g. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13-15-101, 103 (1993).
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rejected by optical scan systems. 1 70 If the instructions directing
the methods to be used by public officials in conducting such a
recount are publicly available, the instructions used by the statepurchased voting machines that count the votes in the first
place-namely, the source code and software-should be publicly
available as well.
Lastly, the policy animating both the Right to Know and
Right to Participate should tip the balance in favor of considering
the software on voting machines a "document" for purposes of the
Right to Know. As Delegate Eck stated on the floor of the convention, the committee drafting section 9 did not want to create an
exclusive definition of "document" because of the "risk [that one
would] los [e] the right to examine a document because it does not
fit statutory categories as a public document." 17 1 The policy animating this provision was to constitutionally presume the openness of government documents and operations. 1 72 Accordingly,
the term "document" should be given broad construction in this
instance, and the software and source code on electronic voting
machines should be considered within the ambit described by the
Right to Know.
III.

OTHER PROTECTED PROPERTY INTERESTS OF PRIVATE
COMPANIES UNDER MONTANA LAW

If a Montana citizen successfully exercised his or her Right to
Know to gain access to the source code and software on an electronic voting machine, the private company could assert that public disclosure of that information constitutes an unconstitutional
taking of a trade secret under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Although the Right to Know provides a powerful vehicle for citizens to monitor and observe the operations of their
government, it is not absolute. Justice Nelson stated in Associated Press v. Montana Department of Revenue,173 "like all constitutional rights-the right to know under Article II, Section 9, is
not absolute. This right is textually limited by the right to individual privacy and... may simply not trump, without more, other
constitutionally protected interests."1 7 4 Moreover, in Great Falls
170. Admin. R. Mont. 44.3.2402 (2007).
171. Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 88, at vol. V, 1670 (verbatim transcript of Mar. 7, 1972).
172. Id.
173. Assoc. Press v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 4 P.3d 5 (Mont. 2000).
174. Id. at 19 (Nelson, J., concurring).
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Tribune v. Montana Public Service Commission,17 5 the Court recognized that
[wihile non-human entities do not enjoy privacy rights under the
right of privacy provision of the Montana Constitution, nothing in
Article II, Section 9 requires disclosure of trade secrets and other
confidential proprietary information where the data is protected
from disclosure elsewhere in the federal or state constitutions or by
76
statute. 1

The analysis presented here would be incomplete without at
least considering whether the disclosure of a private company's
source code and software would constitute a taking under the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The fact-intensive nature of takings inquiry renders it virtually impossible to predict
how a case like this would actually be decided in a court of law.
What can be determined is the general legal framework within
which to decide these issues. It is also possible to suggest some of
the issues upon which the resolution of such a case would turn.
Although Montana law provides no precedent for the issue
here, precedent does exist in the federal arena. The issue of
whether public disclosure of a trade secret would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment was first explored in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.177 In that case,
the Court applied the regulatory takings analysis from Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City178 to an alleged taking of
a trade secret. The federal statute at issue required pesticide
manufacturers to submit trade secret information data to the federal government in exchange for registering their pesticides with
the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 179 Ruckelshaus established three important legal principles to be applied to
any case in which a trade secret is alleged to have been taken by
governmental action. First, it is necessary to establish that the
jurisdiction recognized trade secrets as compensable property interests.' 8 0 Second, the multi-factor, regulatory takings analysis
set forth in Penn Central is the proper vehicle through which to
analyze trade secret takings cases. Those factors, as established
in Penn Central, include: (1) the character of the governmental
action; (2) the economic impact of the action; and (3) the govern175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Great Falls Trib. v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 82 P.3d 876 (Mont. 2003).
Id. at 883.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
Penn C. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 990, 1000 (interpreting 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982)).
Id. at 1003-04.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/2

30

Miller: Electronic Voting

2008

ELECTRONIC VOTING

401

ment's interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. 1 8 ' This approach was affirmed in one of the few federal circuit court cases to consider whether a state law that required disclosure of a trade secret was a taking under the Fifth
82
Amendment.1
Third, public disclosure of a trade secret virtually extinguishes the property interests of the trade secret holder, which
implicates one of the most fundamental of all property interests:
18 3
the right to exclude.
With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central
to the very definition of the property interest. Once the data that
constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the holder
of the trade secret has lost his
18 4
property interest in the data.
In asserting a takings claim, the claimant bears the burden of
showing that a taking has occurred. 8 5 The first step in a takings
analysis is to establish the existence of a compensable property
interest under the Takings Clause.18 6 This threshold requirement
would be satisfied because trade secrets are compensable property
interests by virtue of the Montana Trade Secrets Act.' 8 7 Accordingly, it would be necessary to apply the Penn Central factors in
order to determine whether disclosure of the source code under
the Right to Know would be a taking.
The "economic impact" factor would likely weigh heavily in
favor of finding a compensable or unconstitutional taking. Public
disclosure can render highly valuable trade secrets worthless to
their holders by allowing anyone to benefit from the time and effort that went into developing them. In Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Reilly, 8 8 the First Circuit analyzed a disclosure of a trade secret
pursuant to state law under circumstances fairly analogous to the
present scenario. In 1996, Massachusetts passed an act that required tobacco companies to submit ingredient lists of their products to the state and allowed the state to disclose those ingredient
lists to the general public if the disclosure could reduce the risks
181. Id. at 1005.
182. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
183. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979)).
184. Id.
185. Adams v. U.S., 391 F.3d 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
186. Id. (internal citation omitted).
187. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30-14-401 to 409 (2007).
188. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
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to public health.1 8 9 Various tobacco companies doing business in
Massachusetts challenged the constitutionality of the disclosure
act. These companies argued the public disclosure of the ingredient lists-containing trade secret information representing millions of dollars of research and development'9 0-would constitute
a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 19 1 In its Penn Central analysis under this factor, the First Circuit agreed:
The [companies] have spent millions of dollars developing the formulas for different brands. The evidence shows that public disclosure of the [companies'] ingredient lists, even in part, will make it
those formulas ... some of [which]
much easier to reverse engineer
92
are worth billions of dollars.1
There is no reason to assume the same argument would not be
successful in the context of electronic voting machines. As a result, this factor would probably weigh in favor of finding a compensable taking.
The "character of the governmental action" factor might
weigh in favor of finding a compensable taking, although there are
some reasons it could lean the opposite direction. The primary inquiry under this factor is whether the state action "amounts to a
physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests
through 'some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good . "193 One reason
to weigh this factor in favor of a compensable taking is the fact
that public disclosure of a trade secret absolutely destroys the
holder's fundamental property interest in the trade secret because
it prevents them from excluding others from the use of their trade
secret information. 19 4 From a standpoint of property rights, this
represents one of the most extreme types of interference, tanta19 5
mount to a physical invasion.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the public disclosure of the trade secret is simply an adjustment of a benefit or
burden of economic life to promote the common good. In this case,
the value to common good would be the guarantee of one of the
most fundamental of all rights: the right to vote. The likelihood of
'

189. Id. at 28-29.
190. Id. at 41.
191. Id. at 30.
192. Id. at 41.
193. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (quoting Penn C. Transp.
Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
194. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 ("[Tlhe owner's right to exclude others from entering
and using her property [is] perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests.").
195. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2002).
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weighing this factor against finding a taking would probably turn
on the extent to which public disclosure of the source code would
be necessary to serve the common interest in ensuring that the
vote-counting processes were accurate and were counting each individual's vote. In the Jennings case, the Florida court found that
the FSU expert testing was adequate to ensure the integrity of the
voting systems and that any disclosure to third parties would only
provide a speculative benefit. This finding turned out to be dead
wrong, as was proven later by the initial GAO report. Only after
much more extensive, difficult, and time-consuming testing could
the GAO provide reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the
electronic voting machines had functioned properly. If facts were
presented showing how this trade secret protection threatened the
integrity of the voting process by making effective oversight exceedingly difficult and burdensome, then this factor could weigh
against a taking.
Another argument for weighing this factor against finding a
taking, at least in Montana, would be the extent to which this proprietary arrangement frustrates the exercise of a citizen's fundamental Right to Participate. If a court were to adopt the policybased argument made above-that the proprietary arrangement
prevents a citizen from exercising her fundamental right in an
area where the States retain the ultimate authority to administer
elections-then disclosure of the source code would be necessary
to secure the exercise of a fundamental right and serve the public
good. It could be argued that there is no other way for citizens to
participate in the decisions of their government if they are denied
information about its essential functioning. As explicitly documented in the case of ES&S in both Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District and Marion County, Indiana, the lack of the public's ability to know all the details of ES&S's voting machines has
led to the violation of election law or, at a minimum, a severe
breach of the public trust.
Additionally, the potential disclosure of the source code would
arguably improve the reliability and accuracy of electronic voting
systems. A growing number of experts and activists who have
studied these issues have suggested that the best way to ensure
safe, reliable voting systems is to open them to the public. 196 Such
196. See e.g. Wagner, supra n. 73; Rubin, supra n. 132, at 21; Matt Zimmerman, Statement before U.S. House Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Elections 2
(Mar. 15, 2007) (available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/evotingzimmermanstatement
congress.pdf); Douglas A. Kellner, Statement before Committee on Oversight and Govern-
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public disclosure would not make the systems less secure, but
would likely increase their security and accuracy. 197 The Diebold
example described above demonstrates as much.
Of the three Penn Central factors, however, the strongest
weighing against finding a compensable or unconstitutional taking would be the "reasonable investment-backed expectation." In
Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court noted that "[a] reasonable investment-backed expectation must be more than a unilateral expectation or an abstract need"'198 and is naturally conditioned
against "restrictions . . . [that] we all must bear in exchange for
the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community." 19 9 The Supreme Court observed that analysis under this
factor must take into account the field in which the claimant is
operating, what type of investment-backed guarantees were reasonable for the claimant to possess, and what, historically speaking, has been the level of public concern and regulation in that
area. 20 0 For instance, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
Monsanto could reasonably expect that trade secret information
submitted to the EPA would remain confidential when it never
received any assurances from the federal government in that regard, and "pesticide sale and use . . . has long been the source of
20 1
public concern and the subject of government regulation."
The Philip Morris court expanded upon this analysis in a
manner that is instructive here. Philip Morris involved the disclosure of a trade secret under state law and whether such disclosure
constituted a taking. The court observed that "[ciourts protect
[N] ot every investment deserves
only reasonableexpectations ....
inevitably will be disapinvestors
.
some
.
protection and .
2
0
2
The court also observed that it was necessary to "expointed."
amine the... companies' reasonable investment-backed expectations 'in light of the whole of our legal tradition.' "203 After reviewing the legal tradition concerning the state-mandated disclosure of
ment Reform, Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives 2 (May
7, 2007) (available at http:/www.votetrustusa.orgpdfs/IPCNA/DKellner%20testimony%
20070505.pdf).
197. Rubin, supra n. 132, at 21.
198. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
199. Id. at 1007 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
200. Id. at 1005-08.
201. Id. at 1006-07.
202. PhilipMorris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).
203. Id. at 39 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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trade secrets in the form of ingredient lists, the court found that
tobacco companies could have a "reasonable investment-backed
expectation that their ingredient lists will remain secret." 20 4
First, no case law demonstrated a "well-developed controversy" on
the issue of whether the "state could... require the disclosure of a
[trade] secret formula." 20 5 Second, the court noted that, while the
federal government and states are concerned about "the health effects of tobacco additives, none of their regimes requires the publication of brand-specific ingredient lists."206 In other words, something less than a disclosure of a full ingredient list had historically
been sufficient to allow states and the federal government to adequately regulate the health effects of tobacco products.
Some private companies providing public infrastructure
might likewise have a reasonable expectation that any trade
secrets they have developed will be kept confidential. However,
the area of election regulations is of a different order. First,
neither HAVA nor Montana law explicitly guarantees that private
companies will have their trade secret information in their electronic voting machines kept confidential. Just as in Ruckelshaus,
the law is silent on this point. Accordingly, it would be necessary
to examine the legal traditions governing and regulating elections.
From this perspective, states have a well-established constitutional power to regulate elections, and their authority in this area
is supreme. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Gregory v. Ashcroft,207 " 'the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to
keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the
power to regulate elections.' ",208 Few reserved powers are as wellestablished as the States' rights to control and administer elections. Until the use of privatized electronic voting, the vote-counting procedure was open and transparent. Nothing in HAVA limits
the ability of states to administer and control elections, and indeed the language in HAVA strongly suggests that Congress and
the President wished to maintain state autonomy in this area and
not infringe upon it.209
204. Id. at 41.
205. Id. at 40 n. 12.
206. Id. at 40.
207. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
208. Id. at 461-62 (quoting Ore. v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1970)).
209. See Bush, supra n. 5, at 1 ("[The Help America Vote Act] appropriately respects the
primacy of State and local governments in the administration of elections, while helping to
ensure the integrity and efficiency of voting processes in Federal elections by providing
Federal governmental support for that vital endeavor."); H.R. Jud. Comm., Legislative

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

35

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 2

406

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

As a result, it would be unreasonable for private companies to
insert themselves into this area and expect that their proprietary
interests would always prevail over the public's Right to Know
and Right to Participate. If the privatized system of voting conflicts with the Montana Constitution and citizens' ability to participate in the vote-counting process, it is only reasonable to expect that the commercial values of trade secrecy should give way
to the public interest. Private vendors should expect to open their
source code and software to public scrutiny as part of the "burdens
[they] must bear in exchange for the advantage of living and doing
business in a civilized community. '2 10 Private vendors simply
cannot maintain a reasonable investment-backed expectation that
a state would never require public disclosure of their trade secret
information, especially in light of the many troubling events involving private companies like ES&S. As a result, this factor
would weigh against a compensable taking.
In weighing the Penn Central factors, sometimes one or more
can be dispositive. 21 1 One factor that might tip the balance in
favor of finding a taking would be the character of the governmental action, as public disclosure of a trade secret is tantamount to a
physical occupation. Similarly, the economic impact could be
rather severe. On the other hand, the vendors should not be able
to maintain reasonable investment-backed expectations that their
trade secret data in this area would always remain confidential.
Indeed, voting is an area that is heavily regulated, exclusively
within the authority of the state, and in which transparency is one
of the most critical concerns. Further, if a citizen could show,
based on the conduct of private vendors, a persistent pattern of
avoiding election laws, frustrating public participation in the voting process, and presenting a credible threat to the integrity of
voting, the character of the government action could weigh
against finding a taking.
Ultimately, the resolution of this question would turn upon
the particular facts presented. It is possible that if companies like
ES&S persist in shutting the public out of this process, and if
there are serious allegations against these machines or the comHearing on H.R. 3295: "Help America Vote Act of 2001", 107th Cong. 2 (Dec. 05, 2001)
(available at 2001 WL 1552086 (F.D.C.H)) (Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., testifying
that "[e]nsuring fair and honest elections by eliminating voter fraud, improving voting
techniques, eliminating disenfranchisement, and respecting the constitutional role of the
state and localities should not be partisan issues" (emphasis added)).
210. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (internal quotations omitted).
211. Id. at 1005.
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panies themselves, a court could find that the Penn Central factors would weigh against finding a compensable taking.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Hopefully, Montana will never face scenarios similar to those
uncovered in Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District or
Marion County, Indiana. However, such events may have happened already without the voting public's knowledge. Recently,
the State of Montana saw U.S. Senator Jon Tester elected by a
slim 3,000-vote margin out of 400,000 votes cast. 212 This small
margin, less than 1% of the vote, led to a shift in power in the U.S.
Congress. With such small margins having potentially huge
repercussions, the public should be encouraged to participate in
making vote-counting technologies as secure and reliable as possible. The current system does not allow the average Montanan to
participate in this process because it is shielded behind trade secret protection. Rather, it forces Montanans to trust the private
companies with their right to vote.
We live in an age of increasing privatization of governmental
and public functions. As such, we can expect the conflicts between
commercial values and democratic, pro-transparency values to
continue. 213 Lawmakers, often beholden to special-interest money
and influence, might find it far easier and more convenient to side
with pro-corporate, commercial values at the expense of the public. This is an unfortunate reality of our current political system.
Indeed, the evidence suggests exactly this trend with respect to
electronic voting, as it has taken years for Congress to begin to
address these issues. However, as the events surrounding House
Bill 811 show, private vendors are efficient at watering down any
attempts to get the public more involved in this process.
Montanans, however, may not have to wait around for state
and federal legislators to take action on this issue. Whether or not
a court would adopt any of the positions discussed above, there
can be little doubt that the Right to Participate and the Right to
Know are fundamentally at odds with the privatized approach to
electronic voting. As a matter of policy, Montanans should have a
right to examine the software and source code, or, at a minimum,
212. Mont. Sec. of St., 2006 Statewide General Canvass-November 7th (Nov. 7, 2006)
(available at http://sos.mt.gov/ELB/archives/2006/elections/general/official/2006StateGeneral FinalResults.pdf).
213. See generally Levine, supra n. 9.
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gain access to unredacted federal testing authority reports on electronic voting systems, which are currently on file with the Secretary of State's office. 2 14 However, the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment might ultimately block such public disclosure.
In light of the conduct of companies like ES&S, Montana
should consider doing away with privatized voting altogether and
lead the nation in an approach to electronic voting that is consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the Montana Constitution: the use of open source electronic voting systems. The
development of such electronic voting systems is currently underway. 215 These systems allow anyone to gain access to the source
code and software and do not prohibit public scrutiny or transparency. Such a system is used in Australia and appears to be
working well. 216 Montana should lead the way in turning to these
systems and set a national example consistent with the vision of
open and transparent government that guided the delegates of the
1972 Montana Constitutional Convention.

214. Mont. Sec. of St., Certification Report: ES&S Automark, V.1.0, and ES&S
Automark Information Management System, V.1.09 (Sept. 23, 2005). Because this report
would contain proprietary and trade secret information, the analysis presented in this paper would likely apply to any resistance on the part of the State or ES&S to produce it
pursuant to a lawful request under the Right to Know.
215. See e.g. Open Voting Consortium, http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/home (accessed May 12, 2008).
216. Kim Zetter, Aussies Do It Right: E-Voting, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/
news/2003/11/61045 (Nov. 3, 2003); Australian Capital Territory Commn., Homepage,
http://www.elections.act.gov.au/elections/electronicvoting.html (accessed May 12, 2008).
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